JPRS 77136

8 January 1981

USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

No. 1092

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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN ANALYZED

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 11, Nov 80 pp 15-19

[Article by S. Aliev, candidate of historical sciences: "Problems of the Political Development of Iran"]

[Text] After the collapse of the shah's regime significant changes took place in the social makeup of the government in Iran. The bureaucratic bourgeoisie, large industrial and financial bourgeoisie, large landowners, and top army officers, who together had been the principal bulwark of the regime, lost the reins of government. The group that came to power was made up of religious-political figures, the petty bourgeoisie associated with them, and certain bourgeois politicians who were prominent in their opposition to the shah's regime.

Among the new Iranian leaders, of course, there was no unanimity of opinion concerning the future political organization of the Iranian state and the choice of a path of social development. Moreover, in the first weeks after the February 1979 revolution certain disagreements surfaced among the political groups who came to power concerning the most important problem of post-revolutionary development. As time passed these disagreements had to become more and more significant.

The fact is that the mass social base of the popular uprising in the first phase of the revolution, until late August 1978, was made up of the "traditional" urban middle class strata and certain other groups associated with them, including the paupers, who were mainly former peasants and agricultural workers. These strata and the peasants have the greatest adherence to Islam. On the one hand, therefore, their active opposition to the shah's regime strengthened the position of the Shiite clergy in the revolutionary movement. On the other hand, in part owing to their support the ideas of social equality clothed in Islamic garb advanced by the religious and petty bourgeois ideologists acquired broad popularity among the masses. Already in the initial period of the revolution the opposition religious leaders made a public slogan of the need to replace the shah's regime with an "Islamic way of government."

Although the supporters of it did not clearly outline the shape of the Islamic state, it was obvious that such a "way of government" presupposed a bolstering

of the position of the clergy. The idea of promoting Shiite leaders to the role of the country's rulers was formulated in the early 1970's in the treatise "The Islamic Way of Government," written by Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeyni who was already a prominent Iranian religious and political leader and an implacable foe of the shah's regime. In the fall of 1978 the shah's government, intending to split the opposition forces and taking the aspirations of the Shiite clergy into account, proposed that the prominent Iranian religious leader Ayatollah Seyyed Kazem Shari'atmadari head a council for religious supervision composed of five ulema. Such a council had been envisioned by the Constitution of 1906-1907, but it had never been established. Although, according to some information, S.K. Shari'atmadari vacillated somewhat, he finally rejected this proposal.

In the fall of 1978 the social base of the revolutionary movement broadened significantly. The proletariat, intelligentsia, office workers, and housewives became actively involved. But these significant changes did not lead to a weakening of the position of the religious-political figures. Moreover, thanks to the determined support of democratic and leftist organizations during the period of significant broadening of the social base of the movement, Ruholla Khomeyni became the generally recognized leader of the revolution.

This had a marked influence on the position of political forces in the camp of opponents of the regime. The part of the Iranian national bourgeoise which had been in opposition to the government took advantage of the broadening of the antigovernment and the growing political crisis at the top levels to come forward in the fall of 1978 with claims to the leadership of Iranian society. The representatives of this faction belonged to different bourgeois-democratic and liberal organizations, in particular the National Front which was founded in 1949 by M. Mossadegh. The leaders of these organizations, which had only a small membership, enjoyed a certain degree of popularity among the broader community.

At the same time, certain influential leaders of the National Front and other bourgeois organizations who after August 1978 were permitted to renew their activities in legal and semilegal conditions took a position of compromise with respect to the authorities because they feared a deepening of the revolutionary movement and had little faith in the possibility of completely overthrowing the regime and foreign domination. They did not have a clear-cut program of essential political changes. Moreover, some of the leaders of the front called for keeping the Constitution of 1906-1907 in effect and following the principle "The shah reigns, but he does not govern."

But after Black Friday, 8 September 1978 when military units fired point blank into a peaceful demonstration, anti-shah attitudes became predominant among participants in revolutionary actions. This fact, and in particular the attitude of Ayatollah Khomeyni toward the regime, had a powerful influence on the position of the leaders of the opposition bourgeois parties.

After Doctor Karim Sanjabi, leader of the front, met with Ayatollah Khomeyni in France in early November 1978, they published a joint statement which said that the Iranian crisis could only be resolved on the condition that the power of the Pahlevi dynasty was abolished. By this time Ayatollah Khomeyni was already the unquestioned leader of all forces in Iran struggling to

overthrow the shah's regime. Therefore, there was nothing left for the representatives of the front and other organizations to do except to acknowledge him as head of the people's revolution.

Under these conditions, many leaders of the front and of other bourgeois-liberal organizations were forced to approve of Ayatollah Khomeyni's conception of the organization of the new state, which enabled them to become part of the Provisional Revolutionary Government that was formed after the victory of the revolution. One of them, Professor Mehdi Bazargan, named a cabinet of ministers on the order of Ayatollah Khomeyni. Certain bourgeois-democratic figures, for example the group of the prominent legal scholar Hadayatollah Matin-Daftari, refused to follow this path and went into opposition to the new authorities. As a result splits occurred in the ranks of the liberal bourgeoisie and bourgeois democrats. This further strengthened the position of the followers of Khomeyni, who were chiefly representatives of the "traditional urban middle classes."

Despite the favorable circumstances that evolved after the victory of the revolution, the religious-political and petty bourgeois figures who were firm supporters of the idea of an Islamic state were not able to concentrate full power in their own hands immediately. A struggle for dominance began between various political centers and the Revolutionary Council which had been formed in Paris in January, the Provisional Government, the revolutionary committees, and all kinds of political parties and public organizations participated actively in it. This situation lead some observers to suggest that a situation of multiple authority ["mnogovlastiye"] was present in postrevolutionary Iran. I believe that one should take this statement with a certain skepticism. The existence of different political centers fighting for dominance or to strengthen their own position is an inevitable phenomenon in the postrevolutionary period, especially if we are speaking of a revolution such as the Iranian revolution, which marked an abrupt change in the life of the entire society.

Despite the fact that the spectrum of ideological-political groups became even more diverse after the collapse of the shah's regime, the supreme authority after the victory of the revolution was, as already observed, in the hands of the religious-political leaders and the petty bourgeois and bourgeois figures close to them. But in the very first month two groupings began forming gradually from the ranks of the new political leadership, which corresponds to the formation of two basic ideological-political tendencies in the first post-revolutionary period: the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie with a strong Islamic coloring and the liberal bourgeoisie.

In this sense the disagreements between the followers of the Khomeyni line and M. Bazargan or between Khomeyni's supporters and the group of Ayatollah S.K. Shari'atmadari reflect a different, and essentially opposite, attitude toward the key problem of the Iranian revolution: the question of the nature of the new government and the socioeconomic system of the republic.

As an analysis of the views of M. Bazargan, prime minister of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, H. Nazikh, head of the Iranian National Oil Company, A. Izadi, minister of agriculture and regional development in the Bazargan

cabinet, and those agreeing with them shows, they were all advocates of the capitalist path of development for Iranian society. Therefore, they thought, conditions should be created for the establishment of a multiparty pluralistic political system in the country. They opposed active involvement by the Shiite clergy and, especially important, public and trade union organizations in the structure and activity of the executive authority.

In the very first months after the victory of the revolution M. Bazargan and his supporters began to criticize the actions of the revolutionary tribunals who were imposing death sentences on active henchmen of the shah's regime. M. Bazargan opposed destruction of the state machinery created under the shah and called for moderation. "We are not rightists," he said, "nor leftists, neither religious fanatics nor atheists. We are not conservatives, but we do not reject everything that is old."

The representatives of the rightist liberal bourgeoisie, whose interests were expressed by M. Bazargan and his followers, feared the consequences of a continuing revolutionary process in which an anticapitalist trend was increasingly emerging. They intended to preserve the bourgeois character of the supreme authority in Iran. In this respect it is noteworthy that during the post-revolutionary period representatives of the liberal bourgeoisie openly called for a return to Iran of the top level of the Iranian bourgeoisie, the financial-industrial oligarchy which was outside the country's boundaries as a result of the revolution. Certain representatives of this group were executed as henchmen of the shah's regime.

The top Iranian financial-industrial bourgeois figures, nurtured on "petrodollars" and closely, intimately linked to the shah's regime, can also be described as the neocollaborationist bourgeoisie; its interests fit entirely within the interests of the multinational corporations and Western imperialist powers. In the period preceding the revolution the top bourgeoisie of Iran prospered, especially thanks to the purposeful support of the West and the multinational corporations. The revolution of 1978-1979 not only removed the top bureaucratic bourgeoisie from the Iranian scene, but also, as noted above, the financial-industrial oligarchy. However, the foundations of the economic and financial position of the large bourgeoisie were not completely undermined, and if they had returned to Iran it would not have been particularly difficult for them to become the dominant economic force, capable of exercising a major influence on the development of political events.

The Iranian liberal bourgeoisie have argued in the past and today argue that it is necessary to allow the financial-industrial bosses to return to the country because of the danger of economic ruin and the need to solve the economic problems facing the country.

In their desire to concentrate all real power in their own hands M. Bazargan and other representatives of the liberal bourgeoisie took an extremely negative attitude toward the activities of the Revolutionary Council, the revolutionary committees, and public and leftist political organizations. It is symptomatic that the attempt to restore the top Iranian bourgeoisie to their position of power was accompanied by appeals to reestablish links with the economically developed capitalist states. This line was actively supported by

the military leaders who had come over to the new government and were trying to establish contact with the West related to military affairs; at first they wanted contact on a limited scale to buy military equipment and spare parts.

Khomeyni and his supporters followed the line of establishing an "Islamic society of justice" in Iran, one they said would be unlike either capitalism or socialism. The confirmed followers of Khomeyni, believing in the "third path of development" and the possibility of shaping such a society and enjoying the support of the popular masses, stubbornly resist attempts to restore the top Iranian bourgeoisie to their former positions.

The distinctive feature of the position of the Khomeyni followers is their adherence to the Shiite Islamic ideology and desire to substantiate their political activities with Shiite doctrine. In this they proclaimed themselves advocates of a rebirth of purely Islamic (Shiite) moral and cultural values and of "true" Islamic society. Analysis and comparison of their views with the primary sources to which they refer (the Koran, Hadith, and so on) shows, however, that in many cases we are dealing here with modernization, with an attempt to put books that are sacred to Moslems in the service, chiefly, of petty bourgeois populist sociopolitical ideas. In the hands of neo-Islamic ideologists terms and statements isolated from the Koran and other Islamic sacred books sometimes receive new meanings which make them sound modern.

As a whole the ideas of the Khomeyni group concerning the Islamic way of government, social justice and equality, building a "society of harmony," and the restoration of Islamic virtues and morality are largely utopian; in many cases a frankly conservative element can be seen in their ideals.

When presenting a general assessment of the Khomeyni line, still one must not disregard the fact that the neo-Islamic politicians call for a continuation of the social revolution in Iran. Khomeyni and his firm supporters are characterized by consistent anti-imperialism, anti-Americanism, and egalitarian tendencies. But the struggle between the bourgeois liberals, advocates of a capitalist line, and the neo-Islamic followers of the Khomeyni line, who are engaged in the search for a "third path" of social development regardless of the goals they are ultimately pursuing, promotes a deepening of the social movement in Iran.

This duality and contradiction characterizes not just the ideological conceptions of the neo-Islamic supporters, but also their practical activities in Iran.

In addition to the two sociopolitical forces we have described, the bourgeois liberal and neo-Islamic forces, there is a third significant force in the political arena of Iran. This is the leftist, progressive organizations who stand under the banner of truly democratic and socialist ideas. The followers of Khomeyni are not permitting the leftists to be involved in governing the country. They try to prevent any growth in their influence, although they are not averse to using their support in the struggle against the forces opposing them.

The supporters of Khomeyni persistently follow a course that is expected to preserve the Islamic structural foundation of their government. This is

confirmed by the entire complex and contradictory process of the formation of the new regime in Iran.

Immediately after the armed uprising of February 1979 the question of the name and character of the new state became an important sociopolitical problem. It had to be resolved by a general referendum. The different political groups made proposals on this issue which reflected their sociopolitical orientations. But the Ayatollah Khomeyni and his followers insisted that only one question be presented on the referendum: does the voter agree to replace the existing political system with an Islamic republic? If we consider that the negative attitude of the majority of the country's population to the old regime was an indisputable fact, it is clear that a large majority of the voters would favor the second alternative. Nonetheless, the referendum was boycotted in the non-Persian regions of the country where the Sunni population predominates. The members of certain democratic organizations also failed to take part in the voting. All the same, an absolute majority of the participants in the referendum on 30-31 March 1979 voted for the formation of an Islamic republic. On 1 April 1979 the birth of the Islamic Republic of Iran was officially proclaimed.

Following the formation of the republic the question arose of its political structure and socioeconomic system. A special commission was formed for this purpose and began working out the text of a constitution. The commission worked behind closed doors. In May-June 1979 texts of a draft constitution were published and broad discussion began in the newspapers and magazines of the capital. The leftists and democratic press called for involving organizations and individuals who expressed the interests of the working classes in work on the constitution. The followers of Khomeyni, naturally, insisted on the Islamic character of the constitution. The liberals fought for a constitution that would be in the interests of further development of capitalist relations. The basic struggle, which for the most part was out of public view, developed between the liberals and the advocates of the formation of an Islamic state, the petty bourgeois and religious figures.

At first it was assumed that the final text of the constitution of the republic would be discussed and ratified at a broadly representative constituent assembly. However, apparently recognizing that ratification of articles granting special prerogatives to religious figures would be very difficult at such a forum, the followers of Khomeyni proposed calling a council of experts which would discuss and approve the final text of the constitution.

The persons elected to the council of experts were chiefly followers of Khomeyni. Although certain points in the draft of the constitution on occasion aroused lively debate, which somewhat delayed the work of the council, as could have been expected, the final text of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran ratified by the council accorded completely with the ideas of the Khomeyni group concerning the "Islamic way of government."

The establishment of a kind of theocracy in the spirit of the Shiite Islamic doctrine and the granting of special prerogatives to Shiite ulema is combined with a republican form of state administration. However, the extraordinarily broad rights granted to the leader of the republic considerably narrow the power of the president, government, Majlis, and other official agencies.

The basic law of the republic recognizes many democratic and civil rights in Iranians. However, all these rights must correspond to Islamic principles. The full equality of Iranians of different sex, nationality, religious communities, and the like is declared.

The country's constitution rejects the neocolonialist aspirations of the imperialist powers in relation to Iran. Article No 3 declares that one of the goals of the republic is "full extirpation of colonialism and repulsion of foreign influence." Article 153 prohibits concluding contracts and agreements "which lead to the establishment of foreign domination over the natural resources, economy, culture, army, and other spheres of life in the country." The "intolerability of foreign economic domination" is also mentioned in point 8 of Article 43. Article 81 of the Basic Law prohibits granting foreigners privileges in establishing companies and institutions in the economic area, and Article 146 denies the right to locate "any foreign military bases in Iranian territory," "even where they are used for peaceful purposes."

A distinctive feature of the constitution is the fact that the problem of the social and economic system of the new state is resolved within the framework of petty bourgeois conceptions and carries a strong imprint of duality.

On the one hand, the constitution opposes "any oppression and domination," and declares that the goal of the new government is to "eliminate any oppression, dictatorship, and striving for monopoly." The basic law speaks of the need to "establish the foundations of a correct, just economy in conformity with Islamic principles for the purpose of insuring well-being, eliminating poverty, and overcoming all deprivation with respect to food, housing, labor, health, and social security" (Article 3). It is emphasized that the economy of the republic should be based, specifically, on the principle of "providing for the basic needs of all Iranians as to housing, food, clothing, medical care, and education, and guaranteeing the means of existence for the family" (Article 43). "Exploitation of the labor of others" and "activity that harms others," in particular striving for monopoly controls, speculation, usury, and other forbidden (by the shariat) undertakings "are prohibited" (Article 43, points Nos 4 and 5). Article 46 says that no one can "deprive another of the possibility of working under the pretext of property rights."

On the other hand, the constitution does not outline clear limits to property rights and, specifically, to the ownership of means of production. Furthermore it does not clarify how the acquisition of the fruits of other people's labor, which is to say exploitation of one person by another, will be prevented.

Appeals to the broad masses of the population and the use of mass demonstrations by working people as political support enabled the Khomeyni group to force aside the liberals, who were extremely negative toward the search for a different, noncapitalist path of development. In this struggle some of the liberals attempted, by provoking the right wing of the neo-Islamic group to action against the leftist and democratic forces, to deprive Khomeini of the support of a significant part of the public. They figured that this would make it possible for the liberal bourgeoisie to solidify its position. However, the actions against the leftists, the People's Party of Iran,

Mojahedine Kalq, Fedayane Kalq, and other organizations in December of 1979 were generally opposed by the population and the authorities had to take steps to prevent a broadening of such attacks.

The liberal bourgeoisie and rightist forces in general placed great hopes on the imperialist powers, intending to remove Khomeyni and his followers from leadership with their support and the assistance of those military leaders dissatisfied with the new government, and put a stop to the revolutionary process in Iran. The representatives of the liberal bourgeoisie in their struggle against Khomeyni are using the old technique of accusing those who oppose restoration of the power of the financial and industrial bosses of sympathy for communist ideas. For example, during a seminar in September 1979 devoted to a discussion of economic problems, A. Azadi, one of the ministers in the M. Bazargan cabinet, expressing the views of most of the bourgeois economists who participated in the seminar, described the conceptions of Islamic society as a communist idea "which we have put in a turban."

The calls to return to the conventional capitalist path of development which were made with increasing persistence by members of the Bazargan cabinet in the fall of 1979 were accompanied by steps aiming at the restoration of contacts with the West. These actions coincided at times with a step-up in antigovernment activities in Kurdistan, Khuzistan, and Baluchistan, whose non-Persian populations were demanding that these regions be given autonomy and self-government. Under these conditions M. Bazargan and I. Yazdi, the minister of foreign affairs in his cabinet, met with Z. Brzezinski, national security advisor to the President of the United States, in Algiers. The Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeyni had not sanctioned the meeting. Broad democratic circles pointed out that this meeting took place at the exact moment when the news came out that the former shah Mohammed Reza had arrived in New York and the world press reported a step-up in the activities of counterrevolutionary forces against the new leaders of Iran.

The followers of Khomeyni accused the M. Bazargan government of following a political line that was in the interests of the United States. On 4 November 1979 during mass anti-American demonstrations in Tehran organized as a protest against the arrival of the former shah in the United States, students who declared that they were followers of the Ayatollah Khomeyni occupied the building of the American Embassy, taking American diplomats as hostages. Certain secret documents that came into their hands confirmed the truth of the warnings by leftist forces that the right-wing figures in the government had secret links to the Americans. In particular, it became known for certain that A. Amir Entezam, one of the first deputy prime ministers who by November 1979 was occupying the post of Iranian ambassador to Sweden, had given direct assistance to the United States in organizing a conspiracy for the purpose of removing Khomeyni from power.

During the sharpening internal political struggle of the fall of 1979 the anti-imperialism and, in particular, anti-Americanism which had become an inseparable part of the Iranian revolution long before the collapse of the shah's regime assumed even greater scale. The relationship between these two phenomena, the sharpening of internal political struggle and intensification of the Iranian-American crisis, is deep-seated.

It was not accidental that the two main lines in Iranian politics, the revolutionary-petty bourgeois and the liberal bourgeois, took shape clearly over the issue of the hostages. The M. Bazargan government, which had been expressing the interests of the liberal bourgeoisie with growing frankness and had assumed a compromising attitude toward the United States, fell two days after the students seized the American embassy. On the other hand, the closing of the embassy created significant difficulties for hostile activity by pro-Western and counterrevolutionary forces in the country. They were deprived of a center capable of coordinating their efforts. Favorable conditions developed for consolidation of the new regime.

The American leadership, however, did not wish to accept the situation that had developed in Iran. In late 1979 and early 1980 J. Carter tried to use the events that had occurred in Afghanistan, above all the military aid which the Soviet Union gave to the revolutionary government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, as the occasion for an American-Iranian rapprochement. Although the J. Carter administration was unable to find a common language with the Iranian leaders, the Washington politicians were unwavering in their endeavor to achieve a change in the politics of Iranian leadership.

Washington made a new attempt to incline the Iranian leaders toward cooperation with the United States in late March 1980. Apparently taking the Ayatollah Khomeyni's message to the people on the Iranian New Year as a clear shift to the right, on 26 March J. Carter, using the Swiss diplomatic service, sent special messages to the Ayatollah Khomeyni and to A. Bani-Sadr, president of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In these messages, despite the obvious facts, the American president tried to show himself and the Government of the United States as virtual friends of the Iranian revolution and of Islam, offering aid and support in the struggle against the dangers supposedly threatening Iran. But this action failed completely. Wishing to have no part in secret diplomacy, the Iranian leaders made the messages public. At first Washington tried to divorce itself from these documents, but it was later forced to acknowledge their authenticity. Khomeyni described the steps taken by the American president as blatant hypocrisy.

After this diplomatic failure American policy in relation to Iran again became extremely hostile. Following a new series of flagrant attacks and threats addressed to the Iranian leaders, on 7 April 1980 J. Carter announced his decision to break diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. At the same time he announced that broad economic and diplomatic sanctions were being taken against the country.

Under crude pressure from the United States the ministers of foreign affairs of the Common Market countries and Japan adopted resolutions partially joining in the economic and diplomatic sanctions against Iran. They justified their actions by saying that in this way they were preventing J. Carter from taking military action against the nation.

On 25 April, however, the world community learned of a secret U. S. military commando operation undertaken, according to the official Washington version, for the purpose of liberating the American hostages in Tehran. The operation failed in its very first stage because of technical problems. The participants had to leave Iran in haste, leaving their helicopters, documents, and

even the bodies of dead soldiers in the Dashte Kavir desert. Information given in the American press after the failure of this adventure and the terrorist acts that took place on 25 April and subsequent days in Tehran give reason to say that the so-called rescue operation was, according to the White House's plan, to be just part of a broad action by counterrevolutionary forces and American agents against the new Iranian leaders and had broader purposes than were reported.

As reported in the statement of the Central Committee of the People's Party of Iran on the 1st of May, "The U. S. military adventure against Iran was one link in the chain of a dangerous conspiracy whose purpose is to overthrow the order existing in the country. The first stage in this conspiracy was a disaal failure. However, the dimensions of the danger are still great."

In order to solidify the gains of the revolution and thwart intrigue by internal and foreign reactionaries the People's Party of Iran called on the Islamic revolutionary council, the president, the government, and other official bodies to take a number of concrete steps, including eradication of the positions of imperialism and the pro-Western leaders of the Iranian bourgeoisie, a democratic resolution of the land and nationality issues, and "insuring participation by workers and the working people of the city and country in defense of the revolution."

Thanks to the support of the broad popular masses and progressive political organizations and groups, the process of consolidation of the new regime entered its concluding phase. On 28 May the new Iranian Parliament began to function. The revolutionary council, which had performed the functions of the highest agency of legislative power for 15 months and had also directed the activities of the government after the retirement of M. Bazargan's cabinet on 6 November 1979, is to be disbanded.

The new parliament and government face many problems, including problems in the socioeconomic sphere, with the objective of improving the economy, eliminating unemployment, combating inflation, and the like. The scale of these problems is discussed in the Ayatollah Khomeyni's message to parliament.

Despite the fact that the attempt by the liberals to channel the political line of the new authorities in conformity with the interests of the top Iranian bourgeoisie has not been successful, representatives of the right-wing liberal bourgeoisie are not ceasing their efforts to attain their goal.

The plan of the right-wing liberal bourgeoisie and its allies, the Western powers, is to cause the new Iranian leaders to fear the growing reputation and influence of leftist forces and to bring them into conflict. The fact that the new leadership does not have a constructive approach to certain key problems of Iranian society, in particular the issues of democratizing political life, the nationality issue, and certain others, and its desire to monopolize power and remove the leftist forces from political life conceal a great danger to the destiny of the people's revolution in Iran.

At the same time, the importance of the social movement of the broad popular masses cannot be ignored. They are deeply opposed to plans to restore the

position of the neocollaborationist top Iranian bourgeoisie and continue to fight for a transformation of the sociopolitical structure of Iran in conformity with the ideals of the revolution of 1978-1979. One of its principal features was and still is a rejection of development following the Western capitalist model. The only question is whether the Iranian revolution can arrive at a realistic alternative to the capitalist model.

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ALIYEV, SHEVARDNADZE ADDRESS MACHINE BUILDERS' RALLY

Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 16 Nov 80 pp 1-2

[Report: "Leninist Friendship Makes Us Strong"]

[Excerpts] The peoples of our country are a single, monolithic family as they prepare for the 26th Congress of the CPSU. The remarkable advances made in the 10th Five-Year Plan are the result, above all, of their indestructible friendship, a graphic testimony to the triumph of the party's Leninist nationality policy. The working people of the Transcaucasia are marching forward to the congress in one rank with all the peoples of our fatherland. Like all Soviet peoples we are closely united around our native Communist Party and its Leninist Central Committee.

The labor collectives of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan are greeting the national forum of communists with great labor successes. The collective of the Baku Experimental Electrothermal Equipment Plant, which employs representatives of 15 nationalities, is in the front rank of the leaders of socialist competition. This major electrical equipment enterprise has close ties involving economic cooperation with numerous production facilities in Georgia and Armenia. On 14 November the plant was visited by E. A. Shevardnadze, candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party, G. A. Aliyev, candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party, K. S. Demirchyan, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Armenian Communist Party, and Col-Gen O. F. Kulishev, commander of the Red Banner Transcaucasian Military District, who were in Baku attending a session of the Military Council of the Red Banner Transcaucasian Military District. The workers at the enterprise gave them a sincere and warm welcome.

The people assembled for the rally greeted comrades G. A. Aliyev, E. A. Shevardnadze, K. S. Demirchyan, and O. F. Kulishev with enthusiastic applause. Many voices called out with toasts in honor of the Communist Party, its Leninist Central Committee, the communist parties of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, and the friendship of the peoples of the Transcaucasian republics at this rally in the shop area.

R. A. Abasov, secretary of the plant party committee, opened the meeting.

The friendship of the peoples of our great Fatherland, said Nodar Papalashvili, bureau chief of the plant chief production engineer's division, is shown in many ways. We celebrate the great holidays of our history together. We lay out great building plans together and carry them out by joint efforts. And now the entire harmonious multinational Soviet family is preparing to greet the 26th Congress of our Leninist party in worthy fashion.

Machine tools with digital programmed control are being introduced at our plant. That is the future of our enterprise, its promise of growth. And with great gratitude I must point out that it was specialists from Moscow and Leningrad who gave us practical training for introducing the first such machine tools produced in Azerbaijan. From fraternal Armenia we receive the microelectronic parts necessary for contemporary production equipment. And specialists from Tbilisi helped us incorporate certain production processes. All these things have promoted the development of our enterprise.

Machine operator Al'bert Avanyan has worked at the plant since its first days. Speaking at the meeting he said, amazing changes have taken place before my eyes. The enterprise has become one of the leaders in the country's electrical equipment industry. But what is most important is that our people, the true patriots of our plant, who put their whole soul into the affairs of the collective, have changed beyond recognition.

Socialist competition on a broad scale has unfolded on the threshold of the 26th CPSU Congress. I am happy to report, the speaker said to the applause of the audience, that machine operators R. Kerimov, A. Mustafayev, G. Gamin, S. Ayrapetyan, A. Kudayev, and I are celebrating the congress of our native party by fulfilling two five-year plans.

It makes us happy that our labor is joined to the labor of our native republic, to the labor of our whole socialist Fatherland, and we promise that we will apply all our skill, knowledge, and experience to accomplish new, even greater goals.

We know, said Guseyn Guseynov, mechanic in the boiler assembly shop, how much the party and Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev personally are doing for us and we treasure the enormous attention they give us, the working people. The brigade which I head is taking part in competition under the slogan "26 weeks of shock work for the 26th CPSU Congress!" After figuring our potential my comrades and I resolved to fulfill the quarterly plan for the first year of the 11th Five-Year Plan by the opening of the congress.

E. A. Shevardnadze, candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party, spoke next.

On behalf of all my friends who are representing the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic here, he said, allow me to express my sincere gratitude to you, the entire collective of the plant, to the management, and the party, trade union, and Komsomol organizations, for the warm, truly fraternal welcome we have received. We have felt some kind of special warmth here on the podium, and it is not the bright lights. It is the warmth of your hearts.

We look at you and we see happy, smiling faces. Truly happy faces; and a truly happy people! And the Azerbaijan Republic, its working class, kolkhoz peasants, people's intelligentsia, and party organization have reason to be happy and proud.

The working people of Azerbaijan march in the front ranks of our fraternal Soviet socialist republics. You are consistent winners in socialist competition. We have become accustomed to learning, after the results of competition are totaled, that Soviet Azerbaijan has won again!

You were the first in our country to fulfill the 10th Five-Year Plan, and for this achievement the Soviet people, our party, and the state rightly gave you our highest award, the Order of Lenin. On behalf of the working class, kolkhoz peasants, and labor intelligentsia of Georgia and the Georgian party organization I want to offer sincere and fraternal congratulations on this notable event in the life of your republic.

And I also want, E. A. Shevardnadze said, to congratulate your collective on its great accomplishments in socialist competition.

The accomplishments of Azerbaijan and its people are the result of the truly paternal concern of the Leninist Central Committee of our party, the Politburo of the Central Committee, and L. I. Brezhnev for the Azerbaijan Republic. These great and impressive successes required significant organizational and political work by the Communist Party of Azerbaijan and all communists in the republic. They required a correct, Leninst working style by the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party and its bureau, headed by our friend and brother Geydar Aliyevich Aliyev.

Our country is approaching the 26th party congress. While at your plant we have felt a special pre-congress spirit. We can sense from everything that Azerbaijan, its working class and technical intelligentsia, are working hard to celebrate the party congress.

We are also preparing for this great event. The Georgian Republic is also completing the 10th Five-Year Plan successfully. We have made fairly good indicators in industry, agriculture, construction, and societal life. Next year we will celbrate the 60th anniversary of the Georgian SSR and the Communist Party of Georgia. I invite you to join us in the celebration.

Let me thank you all once again for the sincere, fraternal welcome and wish you continued prosperity in Soviet Azerbaijan, continued successes for the fraternal Azerbaijan party and your remarkable collective, and great personal happiness to you and your families.

K. S. Demirchyan, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Armenian Communist Party, speaking at the rally, conveyed warm, ardent greetings from the working people of the Armenian SSR to the assembled workers and, through them, to all the people of Azerbaijan.

Each time you come to Azerbaijan, he said, you see great changes. Under the leadership of their party organization the people of Azerbaijan have made

progress in socioeconomic life. In the last 10 years the working people of the republic have achieved stable and dynamic economic development and new advances in science and culture. In all of this we see great credit to the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, its Central Committee, the bureau of the Central Committee, and our dear friend Geydar Aliyevich Aliyev personally. We see in this the results of the enormous labor of the working class, kolkhoz peasants, people's intelligentsia, and all working people in fraternal Azerbaijan.

The fraternal Transcaucasian republics, Comrade Demirchyan continued, are moving confidently forward to the 26th Congress of the CPSU.

That is why all Soviet people, including the working people of the Transcaucasus, warmly and unanimously support the wise domestic and foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government. That is why they are so unified around the CPSU Central Committee and the Politburo of the Central Committee, headed by our dear Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev.

We are all preparing for the 26th Congress of the CPSU, which will open up new horizons for our country's development on the path to the heights of communism. Like all Soviet people, the working people of the Transcaucasus are resolved to celebrate the congress of our native party with new labor achievements.

Allow me once again, Comrade Demirchyan said in conclusion, to congratulate you on your great successes in the 10th Five-Year Plan and to wish you continued accomplishments in the future and a worthy celebration of the 26th CPSU Congress.

Col-Gen O. F. Kulishev, commander of the Red Banner Transcaucasian Military District, spoke. He conveyed a sincere and heartfelt greeting from the servicemen of the district to the working people of Soviet Azerbaijan and congratulated them on successful completion of the 10th Five-Year Plan. Each achievement by you, the commander said, is a real joy to the Soviet soldier because it is a contribution to the development of our state and helps improve the well-being of the Soviet people and bolster the defensive might of our socialist Fatherland.

The military-political situation in the world today is very strained, especially in the Middle East. And we, the military men of the Transcaucasus, are the ones the party has ordered to protect and defend the southern borders of our native land.Comrade Kulishev wished the assembled workers success in fulfilling the lofty socialist obligations they adopted in honor of the 26th CPSU Congress.

The next to speak was G. A Aliyev, candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee st secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Az ..

In these tension-packed da, s before the congress, he said, it is a great honor and pleasure for each of us, whether party worker, Soviet member, or military

leader, to be together with working people, with the working class, to be in the place where the material blessings of our native land originate.

The collective of your plant is fairly young. It essentially assumed its present form in the Ninth and 10th five-year plans. In August you launched large new shops that practically doubled the industrial potential of the enterprise. You fulfilled your plans and socialist obligations and are in the front ranks of the working class of Azerbaijan in the competition to successfully complete the 10th Five-Year Plan and greet the 26th congress of our party in a worthy fashion.

I wish to take this fine opportunity to sincerely congratulate you, on behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the republic, and the Azerbaijan Council of Ministers, for your great accomplishments in carrying out the decisions of the 25th party congress and the plans of the 10th Five-Year Plan.

You have built an excellent plant, comrades, one that meets contemporary standards of scientific-technical progress.

But your greatest treasure, comrades, is the working collective. It is a remarkable, diligent, healthy collective that seems like one fraternal family.

Your labor projects today, Comrade Aliyev stressed, are an amazingly fine reflection of the friendship and fraternity of all the peoples of our country, headed by the great Russian people. They are a reflection of the friendship and fraternity of the peoples of the Transcausus. They are a brilliant reflection of practical implementation of the Leninist nationality policy of our great Communist Party. And this meeting today, comrades, a rally for friendship and fraternity among our peoples with participation by the leaders of the Transcaucasian republics and the Red Banner Transcaucasian Military District with a beautiful atmosphere of friendship, is vivid confirmation. We are absolutely delighted that your plant is being visited by the leaders of Georgia, Armenia, and the Red Banner Transcaucasian Military District, that they are here at this rally. In their statements our friends and brothers Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze, Karen Seropovich Demirchyan, and Oleg Fedorovich Kulishev said many fine things about your collective, the working people of Azerbaijan, and the republic party organization. On behalf of you, of all our communists, and all the people of Azerbaijan, I want to thank E. A. Shevardnadze, K. S. Demirchyan, and O. F. Kulishev for their sincere feelings and good wishes.

Today's meeting of friendship is especially significant. This is because we are approaching two great anniversaries of fraternal Transcausian republics. In a few days we will celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Communist Party of Armenia. On 25 February 1981 it will be the 60th anniversary of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic and formation of the Communist Party of Georgia. We are all working together to prepare for this portentous day. In April of this year we and our brothers from all the republics, including Georgia and Armenia, celebrated the 60th anniversary of the Azerbaijan SSR and the formation of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan.

Next year will be the 60th anniversary of the Red Banner Transcaucasian Military District, which was set up by the legendary 11th Red Army. Vladimir Il'ich Lenin sent the army to help the peoples of the Transcaucasus who were fighting to establish Soviet power. We can consider our rally to be dedicated to these portentous anniversaries, comrades.

Comrade Aliyev finished his talk with toasts in honor of the heroic Soviet working class, the fraternal friendship of the peoples of the Transcaucasus, our multinational Soviet State, and the great party of Lenin.

The meeting was declared over, but no one left. The workers of the enterprise chanted "Friendship! Friendship! Friendship!" The ovation and toasts in honor of the Communist Party, the inspiration and organizer of all our triumphs, to the Central Committee headed by our loyal Leninist comrade L. I. Brezhnev and to the fraternity of the Soviet peoples, the source of the strength and greatness of the multinational Soviet State, continued for a long time.

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CSO: 1800

TBILISI RALLY DISCUSSES WORKER DEMOCRACY, PUBLIC ORDER

LD180905 Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 5 Nov 80 pp 1-2

[Gruzinform report: "Creative and Constructive Labor in the Name of Peace and for the Good of the People. From the Tbilisi Dimitrov Aviation Plant's 28th Party Conference"]

[Excerpts] Successes, shortcomings in work and tasks for the future were discussed in detail at the Tbilisi Dimitrov Aviation Plant's 28th Party Conference.

A report was delivered by V. Lomadze, secretary of the plant party committee.

An important speech was delivered at the conference by E. Shevardnadze, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Georgian CP Central Committee.

Among those taking part in the conference was T. Menteshashvili, first secretary of Tbilisi Party Gorkom.

To Work Still Better, Still More Productively

"Of all the problems tackled by our party under the conditions of developed socialism, it is trying hardest to ensure world peace and to improve the material well-being of every Soviet family," Comrade E.A. Shevardnadze said in his speech at the conference.

In order to achieve this great aim we must all continue to consistently and persistently seek ways of further increasing the efficiency of social production, learn how to work still better and still more productively, display a high degree of consciousness and creative initiative in labor and adopt the latest achievements of science and technology.

Now that we have entered the finishing straight of the 5-year plan every day, every hour, every working minute is precious and we must use them with maximum efficiency.

A progressive new form of labor organization--the team contract method--was analyzed in detail at the conference. This method, which has been adopted at the plant, is producing good results. Some 36 percent of the employees work in accordance with the team contract method. In such teams labor productivity and wages are 10-15 percent and 8-12 percent respectively higher than for the plant as a whole.

The organization of labor into teams ensures that there is a high degree of worker interchangeability and comradely mutual aid in production, that every collective's efforts are concentrated and that forces can be quickly regrouped. Above all it considerably simplifies and facilitates production management and the search for additional reserves, leaves the administrative apparatus free to tackle larger and more complex tasks and increases their efficiency. It was stated at the conference that planemakers must develop the team form of labor as broadly as possible.

It is also essential that more attention be devoted to such important forms of involving the working people in production management as collective contracts and standing production conferences.

With reference to the need to improve these forms, democratic initiatives in management must be strengthened and the working people must be infused with a sense of being the true owners of their enterprises, and careful and thrifty owners. This is the basis, the institution which prevents subjectivism in the work of management and makes it possible to ensure a high degree of collective decision-making in work.

Formalism in this work is particularly intolerable since even the slightest manifestations of it can alienate people and rob them of initiative.

Thus a formalistic approach to the solution of questions in this sphere must be firmly eradicated and those who think that they can confine themselves to fine words here must be called to account.

Following the 25th CPSU Congress the party adopted a consistent policy of strengthening the democratic foundations of society, including further developing worker democracy. Those who suppose that this process can take place without the party's active intervention are gravely mistaken.

The party and the state have a vital interest in developing worker democracy since this process logically and inevitably leads to an increase in the activity and sense of responsibility both of every employee and of the entire collective as a whole, and to a strengthening of socialist discipline and organization. All the objective conditions exist at the aviation plant for organizing this work in an exemplary manner.

Here a lot depends on the enterprise leadership, the party committee, trade union and KOMSOMOL organizations and on the director personally. The party makes great demands of today's enterprise leader. A tendency toward administrative high-handedness, inconsistency and an inability to establish a rapport with people are a handicap. He must be approachable, outgoing, democratic, self-possessed and able to win the hearts of every worker and every subordinate. At the same time he must have great determination and personal courage. Exemplary organization and rigorous exactingness are also essential attributes.

The role of deputy economic leaders was also discussed at the conference. Nowadays no single person can cover every problem. A leadership style based on the formula "I did this," "I handled the matter" is not a Leninist style and rules out a Leninist approach to work. A leader's wisdom also consists of achieving a situation

in which not only he himself but also the collective in his charge grows. This is a complex task. But this is the first principle of the democratization of the whole management process.

To Resolutely Eliminate Shortcomings

A fairly good foundation has been laid for ensuring good work at the plant. This was once again demonstrated for all to see by the report-and-election campaign and the militancy of shop party organizations and party groups which have shown their readiness to resolutely overcome all difficulties and successfully solve the most complex tasks which the party sets communists.

The party organization has grown visibly. It is gratifying that the bulk of the new membership is KOMSOMOL alumni and workers in the basic trades. Party members have begun delving more deeply into every sphere of their enterprise's socio-economic development and into economic and production issues.

The plant's collective has adopted additional socialist pledges to mark the 26th CPSU Congress and resolved to implement the 5-year plan for production growth rate to the tune of 190 percent, rather than the 188.3 percent envisaged by the pledges adopted at the start of the year, and to operate on saved fuel and electricity on the opening day of the congress.

In order to ensure the unconditional fulfillment of everything which has been outlined it is important to eradicate, to extirpate formalism and bureaucracy from every sphere of our life, to struggle for exemplary order everywhere and in everything and to ensure a healthy morale. Formalism and bureaucracy sometimes start with little things but eventually lead to very serious consequences, interfere with work and efficient economic activity and undermine people's faith. Along with all other negative phenomena we must oppose formalism in a united front, monolithic and cohesive.

This struggle is not yet over. We are setting ourselves new and more complex tasks and striving in every way to ensure that no one can ever infringe in any way the honor and dignity of honest people and honest workers or trample on their rights.

The truly collective nature of our socialist way of life and the true essence of Soviet people's power are revealed in the very fact that the struggle for exemplary public order and for the fullest possible affirmation of the norms of communist ethics and high morality is increasingly becoming the business of the working people themselves and of the labor collectives.

This is demonstrated clearly by the example of the Dimitrov plant. The crime prevention council and the people's voluntary militia bear a great educational responsibility here. The results of their activity are evident. Until quite recently the territory adjacent to the factory was considered one of the worst in the rayon in terms of operational conditions [po operativnoy obstanovke]. However, recently the situation here has changed considerably for the better. This has come about because the party organization and the whole collective is actively involved in the struggle to stamp out crime, and together with the administrative organ workers they have actively begun to involve themselves in the maintenance of public order.

However, there is no cause for complacency. It is no secret that violations of socialist law and order still occur within the plant collective.

The Dimitrov Aviation Plant's party conference assured the Georgian CP Central Committee and the party Gorkom and Raykims that all the plant's communists and the entire labor collective will spare neither energy nor creative potential in order to successfully fulfill the 10th 5-year plan, realize the increased socialist pledges and intensive counterplans and greet the 26th CPSU Central Committee [as published] Congress and the 26th Georgian CP Congress in a worthy manner.

There was a session of the plant party committee. V.I. Lomadze was elected party committee secretary and V.I. Vaodv and G.R. Leiashvili deputy secretaries.

E.A. Shevardnadze, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Georgian CP Central Committee, and T.N. Menteshashvili, first secretary of Tbilisi Georgian CP Grokom, took part in the work of the party committee session.

CSO: 1800

MANY PROBLEMS WITH BREAD SUPPLY IN BAKU REVIEWED

Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 26 Nov 80 p 4

[Article by A. Naumov: "Bread for Supper -- Why Is There No Bread in Many Baku Stores at Peak Shopping Hours?"]

[Text] The concept of "peak" hours seems to have arisen in the urban transportation system, but it quickly spread to all the other service spheres. Trade in the city of Baku is no exception. It is during these peak hours, from 1700 to 2000, that stores sell the largest quantities of goods. This is when lines form and the need for widespread implementation of fast, progressive methods of service becomes most apparent. At first glance, however, this does not seem to apply to bread; it comes in discrete units and can be distributed quickly. In fact, it disappears from the shelves and racks so fast that the chief complaint heard in the peak hours is: there is no bread.

It is easy to find out that the complaints are justified; you only have to travel around the city at these hours. But why does the shortage occur?

According to information from Bakkhlebtorg [Baku Bread Trade Organization] we learn that 280-300 tons of bread is sold in Baku each day. The overall plan for sale of bread is overfulfilled. Interruptions in supply of bread products to the store are caused by significant violations of the delivery schedule.

Thus, there is no shortage. Sooner or later, but mostly later, the customer gets the bread. But of course, this is not a satisfactory answer. Like dinnerware, bread is needed at suppertime, not anytime. But why is the schedule violated?

First let us look at the objective factors. The city is steadily growing, and the demand is increasing accordingly. But the enterprises of Azkhlebprom [Azerbaijan Bread Industry] have not been modernized for a long time and it is increasingly hard for them to satisfy trade demands. The vehicles of the transportation office are greatly overworked during the peak hours. For these three hours the enterprises and special vehicles must work at their maximum level. The slightest problem will derail them.

There are plenty of problems. To begin with, the schedule itself is flawed; some of the stores have been left out of it. But they have to receive bread.

Therefore, for this reason alone it is inevitable that products will have to be produced and trips made beyond the plan.

In the first six months of 1980 about 100 tons of bread and bread products were rejected for poor quality and returned to the suppliers. This means that the vehicles, despite already being overworked, are forced to make "empty" runs. In addition, the time spent clarifying relations between receiving clerks and the store manager also have to be classed as unproductive expenditures.

Serious complaints are made about the plant dispatching service. Of course, the dispatcher has a hard job. But every mistake made by a dispatcher means empty counters in the stores and more trips for receiving clerks and vehicles. This is the kind of mixup that ultimately causes the planned supply process to become a chaotic "hole-plugging" effort.

More flagrant, deliberate violations are also possible during the peak hours, when stores are calling to the plants and asking for bread. Akper Bagirov, receiving clerk at Bread Plant No 4, had bad luck: store No 188 rejected a batch of slightly burned bread. According to the rules, it is supposed to be returned to the plant where the defective goods are turned in and a new batch issued. But Bagirov thought this took too long, so he showed initiative... by changing the destination number in the invoice and, with no difficulty, rerouting the bread to another store, No 141, where they paid no attention to its quality.

In this case the plant avoided one claim for replacement. But even if the defective goods find a market, this cannot help the enterprise. Moral losses are the beginning of material losses. No resounding phrases about the need to struggle to improve the quality of products will overcome the plant employees' conviction, confirmed in practice, that the stores sell everything.

Unfortunately, during the peak hours that is often exactly what happens. The truck carrying still-warm bread pulls up to a store full of impatient customers. They take the bread quickly, regardless of quality. And if the store manager acts on principle, the offended dispatchers punish him for his obstinacy in their own way.

The same store No 188 rejected a batch of products from the Baking-Yeast Combine (against whom trade workers have an especially large number of complaints). On the next day the combine's bread delivery to the store was 300 kilograms short and then for a whole week it kept deliveries at 50 percent of schedule. The situation was not straightened out until the city trade organization stepped in and took strong measures. But the main victims were the customers!

Let us look at the schedule from a different vantage point. It presupposes that the bread will be baked, delivered to the stores, and sold in a fairly short period of time. But the enterprises of Azkhlebprom work on two and three shifts. The question suggests itself: Why not deliver an adequate amount of bread to the stores ahead of time?

It is not a bad idea in principle. In most cases, however, there is nowhere to which the bread can be delivered. Only 63 of the 155 stores of Bakkhlebtorg fully meet sanitary norms, and 92 of them (38 portable wood kiosks) are in fact

not suited for receiving, storing, and selling bread. Many of them do not have running water, plumbing, and heating systems.

There are various ways to solve the problem. One way is to build new stores; this is fairly difficult if we consider that they would have to be built in old, built-up areas. Another way, proposed by the managers of Bakkhlebtorg, is to redistribute already existing trade floor space; in many cases this is also hard to do in practice. But it is obvious that the construction of new, streamlined bread stores cannot be postponed indefinitely.

Another question deserves attention. Bakkhlebtorg only serves the four rayons in central Baku: imeni 26 Bakinskikh Komissarov, Narimanovskiy, Nasiminskiy, and Oktyabr'skiy. The other bread selling organizations are the raysmeshtorgi [possibly rayon mixed trade enterprises], the Azneft' [Azerbaijan Petroleum] workers supply administration, and the workers supply division of the Azerbaijan Railroad. It is especially difficult to plan supply under such conditions. When there is no bread in Shaumyanovskiy Rayon in the evening, people take the metro to Narimanovskiy Rayon. When the workers supply division closes one of its stores for repairs the number of customers at Bakkhlebtorg increases. Because each of the bread selling organizations operates and makes decisions independently, without coordinating with its neighbors, breakdowns in supply are inevitable. It is perfectly obvious that coordination of plans and orders is essential in such a case. And it would be much more convenient to accomplish it by concentrating bread trade in one place.

Nonetheless, the main thing is still the question of relations between industry and trade. The conflict between the dispatchers at the Baking-Yeast Combine and store No 188 already gives some idea of the situation. But the conflicts are not limited to this. The trade people are not satisfied by the condition of the trays in which the products are delivered, but industry tries to excuse itself because of the difficulty of steaming and drying them. To clerks the importance of the appearance of bread products is obvious, but workers at the bread plant are only concerned with weight. Fifteen stores of Bakkhlebtorg have organized active study of consumer demand, but Azkhlebprom is in no hurry to use the resulting information. The baking industry and the stores, however, have the same job: to satisfy public demand as fully and well as possible. This requires the closest possible working ties and full mutual understanding.

Bakkhlebtorg has been seeking such contacts in recent months. Representatives of the bread plants have been invited to consumer conferences held in all four of the rayons served by the trade organization. Although it not particularly enjoyable to listen to criticism of the quality of your products, Azkhlebprom has admitted that these meetings were useful. Joint meetings of employees of industry and trade are being held. At one of them there was a very thorough discussion of the quality of work by the dispatcher service. Representatives of Bakkhlebtorg are now permanently stationed at the bread plants. But no concrete results have been seen yet from these contacts and meetings. The representatives of the trade organization, for example, in reality are duplicating the work of the plant dispatchers, whereas it would have been possible to agree upon a preliminary (before dispatching to the stores) check of the quality of output, which would immediately reduce the number of empty runs by the trucks. Moreover, such monitoring would force the plant workers to straighten things out.

In his speech at the October 1980 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev underscored the necessity of industry depending strictly on trade, on the consumer. Today, when the subject is bread, the Baku consumer is dissatisfied. The point of the complaint can be put succinctly: timely delivery, quality, assortment. We should recall that some very sharp words were spoken on this subject at the recent plenum of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party. Behind each of these complaints is a whole series of problems, and until they are solved there is no question of providing outstanding service to the people of Baku. These problems must be solved now. They must be solved by combined efforts, in the interests of the consumers.

11,176
CSO: 1827

REGIONAL

WORKERS ASSIGNED TO BAM CONSTRUCTION

From Kazakhstan

Alma Ata KAZAKSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 11 Nov 80 p 2

> [Text] 'Workers of the Soviet Union! You are to accelerate the development of the productive forces of Siberia and the Far East. Above the rates of construction of the Baykal-Amur Main Line [BAM]!" These lines from the October appeals of the CPSU Central Committee in respect to a specific region are addressed to all and this again emphasizes what importance the party attaches to the work which has been undertaken beyond the Urals. This new appeal, spawned by the 10th Five-Year Plan, is undoubtedly addressed to us Kazakhs. The republic whose biography is adorned with the national epics of the Turksib [Turkman-Siberian Railroad] and the virgin lands is trying to reciprocate by a contribution to the new, even more magnificent and gigantic project undertaken by this native socialist state.

Exactly a year ago a special-purpose train arrived in Tynda--the capital of the BAM. It delivered 350 soldiers of the first All-Union detachment of young railroad workers. The volunteers, including Kazakhs, comprised the backbone of the just formed Tynda branch of the road. They faced the task of putting into operation the Tynda-Berkakit line, which was ready to be turned over for use and was expected to join Yakutia with the outside world.

The youngsters proved themselves stalwart lads. Despite the severity of the climate and the unsettled conditions of life, the overwhelming majority of them became adjusted in the new place, increased their skills, and occupied key posts in production. With the very active participation of the warriors of the detachment, during the year approximately 100 million tons of national economy freight and more than 500,000 passengers were transported on the BAM and the line itself, which had been extended through the mountain ridges and Mari, was made a high-speed facility.

In light of all this, the management of the line deemed it necessary to conduct an assembly of the young railroad workers.

And this is what transpired. On a bright and memorable holiday the chief of the board of directors of the BAM and Deputy Minister of Railways V. P. Kalinichev reported the glad news that on that day the Baykal-Amur Main Line, on hundreds of kilometers of which traffic had already been opened, wasdesignated as an independent--the 33rd such--railroad of the country. With Tynda line, it is part of the Northern Baykal and Urgay divisions and to operate them two more key detachments of young railroad workers are being formed.

At the assembly I made the acquaintance of a man who has had a remarkable career--Tleutay Biryukbayev. He graduated from a school in Ushtobe, where they make Kazakh tents. His father, a former children's school official, is an experienced Turksib functionary--he works as a senior foreman at a railroad car technical inspection point. It may be that this prompted the son to choose the vocation of railway engineer. A diploma from the Novogibirsk Institute of Railway Transport served him as a "transit ticket" on the BAM.

Several days ago Tleutay, who had demonstrated his capability as a professional youth leader, was appointed chief-of-staff of the Komsomol Central Committee in the Yakutsk sector of the BAM. He had to proceed straight away to the quarry and to send in time for the assembly a relay train with the now famous Deryungra coal.

"The Deryungra coal is now the chief object of the concern and pride of the Komsomol organizations and the combined staffs," Tleutay explains. "They say that when the Japanese businessmen, who are investing assets on a compensatory basis in the development of the deposit, first saw the high-capacity layers, which in places attain 80 meters in size, tears welled up in their eyes and they fell on their knees at the edge of the pit. This region is now shipping its 1.5 millionth ton of this high-grade coking coal.

Of course, I wanted to find out how life is in the Yakut land.

"I felt at home here when I heard 'Kel'monna' in the Yakut language, "Tleutay laughed. "It seems our languages are very similar. This is a friendly and affable people. And they have given me a gift of good fortune--my wife Galya, whom I call Gulya. She is a doctor by profession. And we have two growing sons: Zhanat and Timurzhan. And as far as the winter itself is concerned, here Tleutay hesitated, trying to find the right words to express his enthusiasm: "I will say one thing: in Kazakhstan I never had a gun in my hands but in Yakutia I have become an inveterate hunter. And the distances are so great!" He raised his hands. "From Berkakit, which in the Evenk language means 'places where they aim crossbows at the hares,' to the white polar bears of the Arctic Ocean."

"And yet don't you miss home, your native village?"--I wanted to know.

"There isn't especially any time to miss it. Then there are many Kazakhs here. I just chanced to meet some. The radio operator on the helicopter flying from BAM to Tyumen is Serik Kamalov, the former second secretary of the Oktyabr'skiy raykom of the Komsomol of Alma-Ata and Karaganda native Maydan Bekzhanov is working as chief engineer of the floating base. In Neryungri we have a Kazakh girl, Saule Kazyura--an engineer for an LEP [electric power transmission line] substation.

"We do not, of course, forget our village. And if you want to try it, one could even try the cold at the pole. Working there as first secretary of the Verkhoyanskiy raykom of the Komsomol is Yerbol Zhanisov, a native of Kzyl-Orda."

The kitchen in his home, it may be said, has been made into an office--everything is covered with geographic maps. It is the meeting place of two of his passions--cooking and travel.

"I can regale my village with the Yakut language," Tleutay said, smiling archly.

But what jobs face the chief-of-staff in regard to the return from the assembly?

Biryukbayev begins to tick off the jobs on his fingers: get the labor forces ready for the concentrating mill and the home construction combine, the covered stadium for the winter, himself for the winter session: he wants to add a construction specialty to his railroad worker's diploma. The situation makes it imperative. You see, the South Yakutsk siding office only recruits the personnel and all the more tangible work must be continued in the future by the Berkakit siding for Yakutsk and that means the necessity to build and build.

In conclusion, I ask to whom he would like to send regards in the homeland.

"I just returned from the homeland two weeks ago," he says. "The meetings everywhere were astonishing. Of course, the visitor from the BAM! And in the Taldy-Kurgan Komsomol obkom the meeting was especially warm--not long before the reception for me they received a creative group of Yakut writers and, remembering it, they applied it directly to me. When it was revealed that it was urgently necessary for me to get to my ailing father in Ush-Tobe, the first secretary of the obkom Komsomol, Kuanysh Kurmashev, declared this a special assignment for the entire airport.

In short, greetings to all my fellow countrymen and an invitation to come to the BAM parallel. Working hands are needed there.

Workers Housing in Bashkiriya

Moscow SEL'SKAYA ZHIZN' in Russian 16 Sep 80 p 1

[Text] The Chiefs Help--Tynda (Amurskaya Oblast)--Envoys from Bashkiriya have arrived at the shore of the water reservoir of the Zeyskiy GES, over which they are constructing one of the largest railroad bridges of the Baykal-Amur Main Line. They have begun to build the homes which will soon house the construction workers from the autonomous republic.

Along with the bridge crossing the artificial sea they will establish a transport center. The Bashkir construction workers face the task of erecting a compound for the railroad workers there.

The patrons from the cities and the Union and autonomous republics who are giving voluntary assistance in the construction of the populated points on the mainline route are helping to considerably expedite the starting of operation of the BAM zone.

From Bashkiriya

Moscow SEL'SKAYA ZHIZN' in Russian 23 Sep 80 p 1

[Text] On the Zeya Sea (Central BAM Sector)--

The construction of another BAM railroad station has been begun on the Zeya Sea shore. Envoys from the Bashkir ASSR have arrived to build it--Yu. Baklanov

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CSO: 1829

DZHAVSKIY RAYKOM CRITICIZED FOR SUPPLANTING ISPOLKOM

Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 22 Nov 80 p 2

[Article by A. Khugayev: "High Standards Above All"]

[Text] Animal husbandry occupies a special place in the agricultural production of Dzhavskiy Rayon. Naturally, the party raykom gives it special attention. Nonetheless the sector is experiencing serious problems. During the five-year plan, it is already perfectly clear, the farms of the rayon will fall more than 350 tons of meat and 262 tons of milk short of the state plan. It is true that this is slightly less than was expected, but this is no consolation.

The 24th Dzhavskiy Rayon party conference carefully analyzed both the objective and the subjective causes of the situation. They discussed the low level of technical equipment at local livestock units, extremely slow progress with construction and repair of livestock quarters, and difficulties with feed procurement owing to the bad weather this year. All these things happened and are happening, certainly, but the work of the conference also revealed a strong concern on the part of the delegates to figure out how responsibly and competently the farm managers and specialists are working.

That is not all either. After all, the level of work by farm managers and specialists depends largely on how it is directed by the party raykom, how it influences the situation in the sector through the communists employed in animal husbandry.

In both of these respects it is noteworthy that the farm managers in the rayon are replaced much more often that the interests of rational management of affairs would require. And with the arrival of a new sovkhoz director or livestock unit manager, for example, there is usually a temporary upswing after which, just as regularly, there is a decline. The report at the conference expressed the interesting idea of a "different level of economic management." It was expressed in relation to several neighboring farms working under identical conditions but achieving different results. The very wording of this question continues to be an issue, but the problem of the level of economic management is equally an issue when it is a matter of one particular manager. In this case, as stated above, there is a temporary upswing at first after the new manager arrives and then an almost inevitable decline later. What is going on? If we look at

statistics we see right away that the qualitative composition of management personnel in the rayon has risen notably. They are mainly specialists in sectors of the national economy, but in agricultural production the farms and their subdivisions have been managed by people with secondary education for many years.

It appears that the reason for the uneven work of farm managers and specialists should be sought in the attitude taken toward them by the party raykom and primary party organizations. It was shown very persuasively at the conference that sometimes after promoting a particular comrade to a responsible position the party raykom ceases to be interested in his further practical and political growth and whether the forms and methods of work being employed meet the high demands of the day. As a result the managers, realizing that they are not being monitored, lose their sense of responsibility for the assigned work sector and, ultimately, the job becomes a mess. This is exactly what happened with former sovkhoz directors Z. Gatikoyev, T. Khabalov, A. Pliyev, A. Tandelov, and A. Tedeyev. This problem has another equally disturbing aspect.

Sometimes things will be going well enough at a sovkhoz, for example. Success of this sort is usually linked to the name of the farm manager, and this is perfectly correct. It is quite different when such a manager starts to be forgiven for "minor" mistakes and when discrepancies between his personal behavior and the standards the party demands of a contemporary manager are overlooked. In this situation the manager's sense of responsibility is again dulled, he takes improper steps in his work, and then comes the collapse. This was the fate of L. Bitiyev, former director of the Tsonskiy Sovkhoz.

I would like to point out the principled approach taken by the delegates at the Dzhavskiy Rayon party conference in evaluating the causes that gave rise to these cases. One of the causes is the fact that the party raykom in many instances replaces or duplicates other rayon bodies, especially the rayispolkom and the administration of agriculture. Sometimes it is simply necessary for the party raykom to step in, for example when the agricultural administration was not taking care of fulfillment of a specific decision. But the problem is that this kind of intervention has become a virtual system and this system diminishes the role of Soviet and economic bodies in resolving problems facing the rayon, develops an attitude of dependency in certain employees, accustoms people to acting only when prompted, and -- most dangerously -- sows irresponsibility.

The following case was cited at the conference. P. Tskhovrebov, a man who has been convicted of numerous crimes and is now again incriminated in large misappropriations of state capital, worked as a bookkeeper in the rayon agricultural administration for two years. With the connivance of an employee of a law enforcement agency P. Tskhovrebov illegally left his place of preliminary incarceration. Without any complications he was hired to work at the agricultural administration. There is no doubt that if the people in the administration had been aware that they would be held fully responsible for the hiring, placement, and indoctrination of personnel, a person such a P. Tskhovrebov, with the reputation of slanderer and embezzler of public property, would never have been put in a "cosy position." But this is the point, that constant intervention from above had dulled the sense of responsibility among the managers of the

administration, and this is what gave rise to cases such as the story of P. Tskhovrebov.

We should stipulate that the conference featured considerable discussion of the unquestioned achievements of workers in the rayon. The names of production leaders were mentioned, as were entire labor collectives such as the collective of the Dzhava Fruit Liqueur Plant, which has surpassed the goals of the five-year plan. Nonetheless, the talk at the conference focused on unresolved problems, and this seems very necessary. The workers and communists of Dzhava could have achieved much more in the 10th Five-Year Plan; they have more than adequate reserves for this.

The delegates to the conference came to the unanimous conclusion that the paramount challenge today is to demand higher standards of every communist and every working person in the rayon. The delegates at the Dzhavskiy Rayon party conference were deeply moved by the words of Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev at the October 1980 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee: we have a great deal of work before us. It is to handle this work, to take a worthy place in the campaign to carry out the decisions of the October Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the 22nd Plenum of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party that high party standards should be elevated into a law that is mandatory for everyone, from the rank-and-file communist to the secretary of the raykom.

The Plenum of the Dzhavskiy Rayon party committee has met. V. Chochiyev was elected first secretary of the Dzhavskiy Rayon party committee of the Georgian Communist Party, S. Sanakoyev was chosen second secretary, and Z. Dzhioyeva was elected secretary.

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CSO: 1800

CONTENTS OF THE KORAN EXAMINED

Moscow NAUKA I RELIGIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 80 pp 27-31

[Article by M. Usmanov, doctor of philosophical sciences: "The Contents of the Koran"]

/Text/



/Arabic literature has many scripts (writing systems). One of the oldest is the Kufic. It was precisely this script which was most frequently selected for copying the text of the Koran by the Eastern calligraphers, who had transformed their craft into a genuine art. Sayings from the Koran and the Sunna were used to decorate mosques and mausoleums; in these instances the marvelous combinations of letters comprised a magnificent ornamentation. Shown above is an example of Kufic writing./ /In boldface/

As we stated in the previous article, the Koran was created under specific historical conditions in seventh-century Arabia. Naturally, it reflected the ideological and political circumstances of this region during that period. The contents of the Koran were affected by the culture, everydaylife,

customs and traditions of the Arab tribes of which its author--Mohammed--was a member (many places in the book are linked with moments in his biography). It also reflected the characteristic traits of the social and class relations which had taken shape among the Arabs during the period when Islam arose.

The material which was collected in the Koran was extremely diverse. This book may be studied as the first major prose landmark of Arabic literature and as a source of history, ethnography, and so forth. But primarily this is a religious book--it was created as the foundation of a new religion, although Mohammed also stated that the Koran was only supposed to remind the Arabs about their earlier true faith, which they had lost. The main contents of the sacred book of the Moslems comprises the dogmatic and religious teachings of Islam; it is very syncretic, absorbing into itself the ancient Arabic cults, elements of neighboring religions--Judaism and Christianity, as well as the views of the Arabs on the world. The Koran contains ancient Semitic, ancient Arabic, Judeo-Christian and other myths and legends about prophets and events which Mohammed drew upon for the foundations of Islam.

The fundamentals of the Koran's dogmatic teachings are undoubtedly analogous to the writings of other religions. However, in comparison with them, it has an extremely essential difference: this book was composed not only as the foundation of a new faith, but also the juridical basis of the life of the first Moslem community, which was created by Mohammed in Medina. Literally everything had occurred in it which caused disputes and doubts and required to be solved, moral and material conflicts, the most varied interrelationships within the community--evrything was reflected in the revelations "received by the Prophet from Allah."

In Medina Mohammed concentrated the secular, religious, and military power in his own hands. Therefore, the Medinan suras and ayats sound primarily like fundamental laws and strict principles, and a considerable portion of the Koran consists of social, legal, and moral precepts. In the Early Middle Ages the Arabs made no distinction between legal and moral norms, and this was reflected in the Koran. Subsequently, in the 10th--12th centuries, based on these legal and moral principles the Shariat was formed[1]-- a compilation of rules affecting literally all aspects of a believer's life. They were observed very meticulously, inasmuch as for a Moslem the Koran is the word of Allah, and all the precepts based on it are considered by him to be the will of God. Even the petty details of everyday life were presented as connected with the name of Allah, since all norms were prescribed by the Shariat.

Various scholarly schools have different approaches to the study and evaluation of the contents of the Koran as a 7th century literary landmark. Bourgeois Islamic studies and Koranic studies have always regarded it either as a literary work in itself or only as a sacred religious book; moreover, the sources of the Koranic ideas were sought in other

religious writings. But the Islamic traditional literature has always emphasized that the Koran is the word of Allah, and hence an approach to it as a literary landmark or even an object of study in general is not permitted.

Marxist-Leninist scholarship regards the Koran as the main source of Islam, and its foundation and, proceeding from this, it evaluates the social and class character of Islam as religious ideology. The other aspects of its study--historical, ethnographic, linguistic, etc.--are ancillary in nature. Based on such a methodological approach, let us also turn to an analysis of the contents of the sacred book of the Moslems.

And so, the Koran first of all sets forth the fundamentals of the religious-dogmatic teachings of Islam. But wherein lies the difference between the principal preaching of the new religion in comparison with the previous beliefs of the Arabs?

Preaching the "True Monotheistic Faith"

The principal idea of the Koran is the assertion of monotheism, the oneness of the creator of all being, the lord of the worlds. The doctrine of the oneness of God--Allah--is the fundamental dogma of Islam--the "taukhid." "Say: 'He--Allah is one' (112,1),[2] 'Praise be to Allah, the Lord of the Worlds'"(1,1)--there are many such assertions in the Koran. The rise of the idea of monotheism was justifiable and according to principle for the Arab tribes in the Seventh Century; for it was precisely during this period that the historical necessity of their unification matured. This required a single earthly power and, of course, a single heavenly power.

The striving of the Arab tribes towards unification was reflected in their abandonment of polytheism. The Koran contains many threats and curses directed at polytheists. "Beat up polytheists wherever you find them, seize them, beset them, and lay ambushes for them. . . ." (9,5)--this is what Allah orders. Moreover, the idea of one god in Islam took shape under the obvious influence of Judaism and Christianity, although here it is more consistent. The Koran, for example, sharply opposes the Christian trinity (4,169; 5,116; 9,31, etc.). The spiritual ties between initial Islam and these religions is clearly distinct in the suras of the Meccan period. In the latter Christians and Jews are even acknowledged as true believers, and it is stated that the god of all three religions is one and the same (see: 2,59; 2,130; 4,161, etc.).

While it recognizes the truth of the Judaic and Christian writings, the Koran, nevertheless, warns that they were transmitted by God incompletely (4,54); furthermore, people strayed away from these precepts, interpreted them incorrectly, and became divided in their faith (2,209). The Koran, on the other hand, is the last and complete revelation sent down by God.

Nevertheless, in this "last and complete revelation" the picture of the creation of the world and of man coincides in its basic outlines with the Biblical account, albeit even more contradictory and inconsistent. By a comparative analysis of the corresponding places in the Koran (2,111; 7,52; 10, 3; 41,8--11, and others) and the Bible (Book of Genesis, Chapter 1, Verses 1--19) we can reveal certain discrepancies in the details of the story of the creation of the world. This can obviously be explained by the fact that Mohammed knew the Judaic and Christian writings in the oral versions of the preachers, but he himself had not read them (it is stated in the Koran that he was "ummi"--illiterate). There is no doubt, however, that the source here was one and the same--that of Ancient Semitic traditions. There is also little difference between the Biblical and Koranic presentations concerning the creation of man (Koran: 7,10; 38,71-72, and others; Bible: Book of Genesis, Chapter 2, Verses 7--8, 21--23). From the teachings of Judaism and Christianity the author of the Koran also borrowed the legends about the falling into sin of the first humans--Adam and Eve--and the idea of the sinfulness of man.

In preaching the "truth of Islam," the Koran contrasts Moslems with the followers of all other religions. As he develops the idea of Moslem exclusivity, the author of the Koran gradually approaches the idea of the jihad, the holy war against the infidels--against all those who have not recognized Allah as their god. "And when you meet those who have not accepted the faith, smite them on the neck with a sword...." (47,4). "And kill them wherever you meet them," the Koran advocates (2,187). And it explains: "It is not you who are killing them, but it is Allah who will have killed them" (8,17). It is interesting to note that at the beginning, in the suras of the Meccan period Jews and Christians are not called "unbelievers"; Mohammed recognized them as "people of the Book." But, as we have already stated, the circumstances of life dictated the suras of the Koran to Mohammed. So when conflicts with Christians and Jews occurred within the Moslem community, Mohammed proclaimed a new "revelation from Allah" to his fellow-tribesmen: Jews and Christians "departed from the straight path," and so they must also be annihilated. The evolution of the idea of the jihad clearly shows the extremely direct connection between his revelations and the historical events of the early period of Islam. Moreover, the sacred book of the Moslems clearly divides people into two categories--the true believers and the Kafirs (see: 2,259; 3,106; 5,62, and others). K. Marx remarked that this preaching has created in society an atmosphere of constant hostility between Moslems and Non-Moslems.[3] Such, inevitably, is the logic of preaching every "true" religion.

Prophets, Predestination, and the Last Judgment...

As we have already stated, the Koran sets forth the fundamentals of the religious-dogmatic teachings of Islam, in which there is also a place for the religious treatment of the nature of man and social life. In particular, we have considered two dogmas pertaining to these fundamentals: the central one is belief in Allah--the one god--and the recognition of the Koran as the

last, true scripture. Scholars have justifiably noted that there is no system in its dogmatic concepts, they are fragmentary, and their incompleteness (and frequently their contradictory nature as well) is evident. This compelled the theologians to labor quite a bit in order to bring the dogmas of Islam into better order. Some 400--500 years were required for this purpose.

Based on the Koran and the "hadiths," in the medieval Moslem theology the following two systems of dogmas were worked out: the seven-component among the Sunnites (belief in Allah; in prophecy and the prophets; in the sacred scriptures; in angels; in the Judgment Day; in the resurrection of the dead; and in predestination) and a five-component system among the Shiites (belief in Allah; in the righteous justice of Allah; in prophecy; in the resurrection of the dead and the Judgment Day; and in the "imamate" --the legitimacy of the authority of the imams--the descendants of Ali). We shall touch upon only a few of these, the ones which most markedly indicate the nature of the Moslem religion and its connection with other faiths.

The Koran completely included within itself the Judaic and Christian ideas about the prophets, and it Islamicised most of the Biblical personae. In the sacred book of the Moslems we encounter, for example, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Job, Jonah, Moses, Aaron, Jesus Christ, and John the Baptist. Herein, of course, they acquire their respective Arabic names: Nukh, Ibrakhim, Iskhak, Yakub, Ayyub, Yunus, Musa, Kharun, Isa Masikh, and Yakhiya. The Koran also has mythical and its own Arab prophets--Khud, Salikh, Shu'ayb, Lukman, and others. In this book the term "prophet" is also applied to certain historical figures: David (Davud), Solomon (Suleyman), Alexander of Macedonia (Zu-l-Karnayn--the "Double-Horned") and others.

In accordance with Moslem teaching, God many times sent prophets into the world as human beings, but only to a people which had strayed from the true path. The Koran repeats the myths about the punishment of peoples for their disobedience and lack of faith.[4] And then, finally, the time arrived when Allah sent to people the last of the prophets--Mohammed; moreover, he chose him fromamong ordinary people, and laid upon him the "seal of the prophets," and sent him a revelation that he should lead the people onto the true path of righteousness which they had forgotten (33,40; 53,4--12; 37,34--36 etc.).

But how should this be done? One of the main methods, states the Koran, is the jihad--a war against the infidels, against those who are in error and have still not started along the path of Allah. This idea subsequently underwent changes at various stages of history; preachers interpreted it in various different ways, citing the Koran and the hadiths. However, during the period of very early Islam, when the Arabs were conquering many territories, the following hadith was prominent:

"Various prophets were sent by God in order to demonstrate His various attributes: Moses--kindness and mercy; Solomon--wisdom, greatness and glory; Jesus Christ--justness (pure conduct), omniscience (a knowledge which he manifested by his ability to read the secrets of the heart), and power.

However, not a single one of these attributes was sufficient to consolidate conviction, and even the miracles performed by Moses and Jesus were regarded with disbelief. Then I, the last of the prophets, was sent with a sword. Let those who propagate my faith not enter into discussions or disputes, but kill all those who refuse to submit to the law (of Allah)....!"

And so that there should not arise among the warriors of Islam any doubts about the truth of the path, the Koran promises: "Those who are killed on the path of Allah will be taken and preserved in good order by Him, and He will lead them into paradise. . ." (47,5--7).

Here, as in many other ayats, the figure of Mohammed is outlined quite clearly--at first a preacher, then a politician, ruler, and lawgiver. But the more or less reliable biographical data about him has been lost among the many myths and legends about the miracles of the Prophet.

One of the leitmotivs of Mohammed's preaching is the perishable quality of life on earth and the eternal quality of bliss in the other world. Herein Islam is no different from the other religions: "Life on earth is only a game and amusement; the future life will be better for those who are God-fearing" (6,32). The dogma of belief in life beyond the grave, the preaching of patience and reconciliation, is usually the most clear-cut expression of the essence of religion as an ideology of class inequality. From the preaching of patience and hope only for the life in the other world there logically flowed the disapproval of the struggle for happiness on earth as well as an active attitude towards "life on this earth." "Allah is patient," states the Koran (2,148). The scenes of the Last Judgment and Hell which are described in this book are cruel, and they reflect the characteristics of the life of the 7th Century Arab nomads. A fiery Gehenna, a burning sun, and a tortured thirst--this is Hell. But torments similar to these were also known to Arabs on earth. While paradise, bliss, of course, consisted of water, coolness, and shade. Islam's representations of paradise and Hell are very sensual and concrete; their level is quite primitive and they have no philosophical profundity.

Matters are somewhat more complex with regard to the dogma of predestination. On the one hand, the Koran undoubtedly contains the idea of the predestination by God of all human actions. K. Marx emphasized that fatalism was the tie-rod of the Moslem system.[3] The fatalistic treatment of social phenomena follows logically from the Koranic teaching about the omnipotent God, who "has power over everything," and about his absolute strength and dominion. Such concepts determined the world view of the believers during the Meccan and Medinan periods. But, on the other hand, the Koran contains passages which contradict the idea of predestination--because, of course, man is not relieved of the responsibility for his actions! This question became the subject of interminable disputes among various theological schools of thought.

Without going into details here, let us note that the interpretation by the theologians of the problem of fatalism and free will reveals an internal contradiction inherent in the dogmatic system of Islam in general. The acknowledgment of an absolute fatalism reinforced the idea of the limitless power of the one God. But this also meant a denial of man's responsibility for his sinful deeds. Absolutization of free will, on the contrary, since it reinforces the idea of responsibility for sins, led to a denial of the limitless power of God. For Islam this problem has remained unresolved; it exists as an imminently inherent internal contradiction.

Cult and Ritual Established Principles

From the contents of the Koran Moslem lawgivers extracted five main cult requirements, which in fact had already existed among the pre-Islamic Arabs. In Islam they did not become compulsory immediately but rather gradually--part of them during the Meccan period, and part of them during the Medinan period of the very early history of this religion. Only a certain few elements and traditions of the Moslem cult were new and in contrast to the pre-Islamic traditions.

One of the early cult requirements was the confession of faith--the pronunciation of the formula (the shahada): "There is no God but Allah, and Mohammed is his messenger." In essence, this was the oral acknowledgment of two dogmas--the oneness of God and prophecy, which permeate the entire Koran. The pronunciation of the shahada became the first and fundamental criterion for membership in Islam.

After this requirement came the act of prayer worship five times a day (Arabic--"salat," Persian--"namaz"). As early as the fourth year of Mohammed's preaching, mention was made of the two basic elements of prayer--the ta'zim (bow) and the sadja (bending over and touching the forehead to the ground) (53,62). All the positions of a person in prayer, introduced by the Koran, had in fact existed even prior to Islam--among the khanifs. But at the beginning of the Medinan period Mohammed established the direction of prayer--the kibla: towards the Temple of the Kaaba in Mecca (2,136--144). And prior to this Moslems at first had prayed raising a hand and the face to the sky, and later they turned in the direction of Jerusalem, which among the pre-Islamic Arabs was considered to be a holy city. Why did Mohammed change the direction of the prayer? On the one hand, he began to have conflicts with the Jews. On the other hand, he wanted to enlist the support of the Meccan aristocracy, who worshipped the Kaaba. Furthermore, this temple was close to the Arabs--their tribal gods had been located there previously. With regard to the number of prayers per day, the Koran mentions only three times; prayer five times a day came later. Many other prayers were subsequently put into practice based on the hadiths.

Along with the act of prayer worship five times a day, the basic requirements for ritual ablution (takharat) were introduced at the same time, and its

principal types were established: washing of the hands, face, and feet; complete washing--bathing; cleaning by means of pouring sand or dust (5,8--9).

Of vital necessity was another requirement which was called for and set down in the Koran--that of material contribution to the benefit of the community. Mohammed's followers in Mecca, and later the community in Medina, were in need of funds--they subsisted on revenues gained as caravan guides and by military means. From the very beginning this requirement was set forth as one of the most important "pillars of Islam" (25,67; 27,3; 14,36, and others). In that early period these collections still lacked a single designation: in the Koran one encounters expressions such as "zakat" (obligatory charity tax), "expending," "giving of one's property," "making a loan to Allah," and "alms" (sura 2).

And during the Medinan period, parallel with the "zakat," one of the principal requirements became participation in a jihad--a holy war. The new faith needed to be affirmed by arms--otherwise it was impossible to vanquish the Meccans, who had not acknowledged the Prophet. Hence the jihad became an extremely important requirement of Islam, even more important than all the others. The most faithful Moslem was considered to be the one who contributed the "zakat" and who also took part in battles. But, as we have already stated, the jihad did not become one of the five pillars of Islam.

At the beginning of the Medinan period a fast was established, to last for the 30 days of the month of Ramadan--the "urasa" . The Koran states that it was precisely in this month that this sacred book began to be "sent down" 997,1--5). It must be said that Ramadan was considered holy even among pre-Islamic Arabs. The Koran prescribes strict rules for the fast, in particular, not only complete abstinence from eating, drinking, and smoking from early morning until darkness, but also a complete ban on all pleasures (including a prohibition on washing with cold water during the hot part of the day, etc.).

Detailed directions are contained in the Koran concerning the principal holy place of Islam--the Temple of the Kaaba in Mecca, as well as the ritual of the pilgrimage--khadjja--which is connected with it. And here we should note the following: this temple was a site of worship for the Arabs long before the rise of Islam. However, after the move of Mohammed and his followers from Mecca to Medina the pilgrimage to the Kaaba and its worship was cut short for a certain length of time because of the wars between the Meccans and the Medinans. This ritual was renewed in 628.

One of the important and obligatory elements of the khadjja is the bringing of a sacrifice--a very ancient ritual among the Arabs. The Koran mentions that human beings used to be offered up as sacrifice--children and slaves. In Sura 108 sacrifice is designated as "nakhara" (a person cut off, without descendants), which, in the opinion of specialists means a human sacrifice, as distinct from the term which then entered circulation, "kurban"--offering up animals as sacrifices. Connected with this ritual is the Moslem

holiday of kurban-bayram (in Arabic "id al-adkha"--a holiday of offering up sacrifices). On that same day, when in accordance with the ritual of khadj-ja, the sacrificial animals are slaughtered in Mecca, throughout the entire Moslem world the true believers do the same. Comparative analysis of the precepts of the Koran and those of the Bible on animal sacrifice (see, for example, the Bible, Book of Genesis, Chapter 22, Verses 1--13. Koran, 37, 99--107) can convince us that in this case both sacred books have followed Ancient Semitic traditions.

Legal and Moral Norms and Limitations

Evidently, prior to Islam the Arabs had no code which would serve to regulate their lives on a social and moral level. The Koran mentions that it was sent down as the Arab code of law (13,37). However, we cannot fully agree with this assertion. The legal and moral statements of the Koran are extremely fragmentary, dispersed throughout various suras and ayats, so that they served only as a foundation for the system of such norms which was subsequently worked out--the shariat, which took final form during the 10th--12th centuries.

In the suras of the Meccan period, when Mohammed was still not acknowledged as the Prophet by everyone, there is a predominance of moral preaching. In Medina he created a religious community--a prototype of the future Moslem state, and in the revelations of this period one can already hear the voice of the military leader, the dictator, the chief and sole judge in all possible Moslem affairs.

First of all, attention is drawn to the "divine" requirement to subordinate oneself to whomever has power in his hands: "Submit to Allah, and submit to his messenger and the holders of power among you...." (4,62). In other words, every disobedience to the authorities is evaluated as an insubordination to Allah--that is, sin and crime (transgression) are identical. This is a fundamental idea of the legal and moral establishments of Islam. Sin is a criminally punishable crime, while crime is a sin against Allah. For every sin, revenge from Allah is to be expected. Moreover, it even specifies the punishment which man must receive on earth, even before the Last Judgment. "Cut off a thief's hand...as a frightening penalty from Allah," the Koran prescribes, for example (5.42).

A harsh punishment is designated for adultery--100 lashes (24,2). But subsequently the shariat, on the basis of hadiths, established an even more cruel punishment--death by stoning. At first alcoholic beverages were simply not approved of (2,216), and it was only forbidden to pray while in a state of drunkenness (4,46). But then such beverages were banned completely (5,92). However, the harshest punishment is that provided by the Koran for abuse directed at Allah and Mohammed: "The retribution against those who quarrel with Allah and his messenger is that they will be killed, or crucified, or their legs cut off, or they will be exiled from the earth ...." (5,37).

There are many moral precepts in the Koran: to aid others, to be truthful and modest, refrain from killing people, not to mock others, not to bandy about pejorative nicknames (by the way, this precept was linked with an episode in Mohammed's family: two of his wives were quarreling once, and one of them insulted the other), not to bear false witness, not to revile people behind their backs, not to violate oaths, and so forth.

A great deal of space in the sacred book is devoted to questions of family and marriage, as well as the mutual relations between children and parents. Everything is specified down to the petty details, including inheritance, the establishment of paternity, guardianship, the possibilities for divorce and a new marriage, etc. Here we must note how demeaning and dependent in the Moslem world from the very beginning was the position of women. The Koran emphasizes their utter economic dependence on men, their secondary role in the family and in society (4,38). In essence, this was a legitimization of the lack of women's rights which was held over from the clan and slaveowning society. A Moslem was permitted to have as many as four wives at one time (4,3), although the Koran states that it is more preferable to have one wife. For disobedience it prescribes that a woman first be scolded, then given a good beating (4,38), while for infidelity she is to be kept locked up until death (4,19). Marriage is forbidden with infidels and polytheists (5,7; 2,220).

The Koran also legitimizes the seclusion of women. It prescribes that she wear a veil, and that she not show her face or ornaments (24,31). At first this directive only affected the wives of Mohammed (33,29--32,59); he once made one of them jealous, and right then and there his new "revelation" emerged. But subsequently the wearing of the veil (the Koran uses two terms: the "jilbab" --a veil--and "hidjab"--a curtain) was put into practice, to one degree or another, in all Moslem countries, for the Koran also provided general precepts pertaining to all women where the circle of men was defined (husband, father, brother, son, father-in-law, nephews, slaves, male servants, children who have not yet reached maturity) before whom she could show herself with an open face. As an exemplary model for women the Koran considers the wife of the Biblical pharaoh (in the Bible this is the wife of one of the great lords of pharaoh--Book of Genesis, Chapters 37--41) and Mary--the mother of Jesus Christ (66,11--12).

The Koran forbade the ancient Arab custom of burying alive a newborn baby girl. If we judge by the contents of the ayats, there were two reasons for such a custom: poverty, the impossibility of feeding children (17,33), as well as the idea that if the first child was a girl, it would bring bad luck to the family (16,60--61). Mohammed also abolished the ancient custom of the levirate, which had existed among many ancient peoples of the East (see Bible, Book of Laws, Chapter 25, Verses 5--10), according to which a widow could marry only the father or brother of her deceased husband. The Koran permits a widow after a certain specified period to marry again according to her own choice (2,234).

As we have already stated, the Koran's precepts on family and marital problems also reflected various episodes and events in Mohammed's family. Once he learned that certain of his wives were dissatisfied with their marriage to him. One of them was bold enough to request that she be let go, and he did let her go. This was legitimized in ayats 28--29 of sura 33.

Personal experience dictated the precept regarding a woman's punishment for adultery only in case her transgression is affirmed by four eyewitnesses: "And those who make an accusation of unchastity, but then fail to bring forward four witnesses--never accept testimony from them" (24,4). This "revelation" saved his favorite wife Aisha from punishment; she had been accused of adultery with a young Moslem.

Many accusations have been directed at Mohammed in missionary literature, as well as in our propagandistic literature regarding his having many wives. In the year of his death he had nine remaining wives, and his total was 14, not counting slave-girls and concubines. This need hardly be made the main argument in a dispute against the ideology of Islam. Soviet scholars have approached this problem historically. The Ancient Arabian concepts of worth and political glory were connected with the number of wives which a ruler possessed. Certain of Mohammed's marriages were concluded for political reasons--in order to strengthen his personal ties with the powerful people of the community. The well-known Soviet Islamic scholar, Ye. A. Belyayev, supposes that "Mohammed's having many wives was called for by his position as ruler of a large city--Medina."[6]

The Koran contains a multiplicity of prohibitions and mandatory prescriptions of an everyday nature, touching primarily on food, drink, reception of guests, and so forth. It is not possible to enumerate them all here. Almost all of them have a genuine basis in fact. It is not completely clear whence appeared the prohibition against pork--pigs are not raised at all in Arabia. It is probable that this is an Ancient Semitic prohibition which came into Islam by tradition (with regard to the prohibition of pork among the Jews, see the Bible, Book of Leviticus, Chapter 11, Verses 7--8).

In a number of ayats in the Koran the bowing down to idols is forbidden (6, 74; 14,38), and, in connection with this, the making of idols and the imparting to them of the appearance of a living being. This served as an occasion to ban the depiction of human beings and animals.

Some History, Geography, and Ethnography

As we have already stated, the Koran reflects the life, daily customs, and various ideas of the seventh-century Arabs, the level of their culture, and their knowledge of the world. To be sure, these data are not abundant, but without their characterization the story of the contents of the sacred book of the Moslems would be incomplete.

Among many peoples of the Ancient East there existed the concept of seven heavens, erected in rows. They are also in the Koran and, thanks to the power of Allah, they were held up without supports (13,2). Mention is made of guiding stars, the Sun and the Moon, which were created for illumination and for keeping time. According to the Arab concept, the Earth was a flat surface, whereas the mountains were created for equilibrium (78,6--7; 16, 15; 21,32). Two seas are mentioned (27,62)--one of fresh water, the other of salt water (25,55; 35,13), but it is unclear which ones are referred to. The Koran contains a number of geographical names: the Valley of Mecca (48, 24), Medina (9,102; 33,60) and its pre-Islamic name--Yathrib or Yasrib (33, 13). Places are named where battles for the faith took place: Badr (3,119), Hunayn (9,25). Stories are told about the Kaaba; in the Koran it is called the "inviolable mosque" (in Arabic "al-masdjid al-kharam"), and about the Temple in Jersalem; it is called the "most remote mosque" (in Arabic "al-masdjid al-aksa"). Mention is made of the holy places in the Khidjaz (Hejaz)--the uplands of Safa and Merva, the mountains of Arafat and Sinai, the Tuva Valley; also mentioned are the "holy land"--Palestine, as well as Egypt and Babylon.

There are many statements about the Arabs, the Kureyshites (sura 106 calls the the "kuraysh"), the Hebrews (Jews), Sabi (Manden in Mesopotamia), the Saba people (Shebans, living in the South, in Yemen) and their ruler, the Queen of Sheba, the Byzantines (in Arabic--rumy [Romans], as they are called in sura 30), the Tubba peoples, and the Ad and Samud tribes.

The Koran also tells us about certain historical events in the lives of the first Moslems--about the move of Mohammed's followers from Mecca to Medina --the Khidjra (Hegira); about the victory over the foes of Islam at the Well of Badr--"Allah aided you at Badr" (3,119), about the defeat of the Moslems at Mount Okhod--which was a "punishment for timidity and disobedience," about the "war of the trenches," about the truce between Medina and Mecca, about certain campaigns of Mohammed's detachments against neighboring tribes. In sura 10 (ayat 17) it is stated that Mohammed lived in Mecca for a long time before he began his preaching ("For I have spent my entire life among you prior to this....").

We may extract from the Koran some reliable data concerning the life and everyday customs of the Arabs. Thus, prior to Islam they used to express their worship of the Kaaba by whistling and clapping their hands (8,35); along with other coins in circulation were Roman dirkhemy (drachmas); the Arabs lived principally in tents, and their clothing was made primarily of leather and wool--because, of course, they were livestock raisers. In addition to livestock products, they were familiar with honey, and they knew how to make wine; they used to catch fish and they extracted pearls from the sea--the word "diver" is encountered in the Koran. The Arabs were maritime sailors; they had cavalry troops and infantry. Their women wore bracelets and necklaces, and they dressed themselves in satin and brocade. Criminals were held in chains and bonds, and death by stoning was a widespread punishment....

Class Essence of Mohammed's Preaching

In talking about the Koran's contents, we set forth in passing its social and class characteristics. In summing up, we should again emphasize that essentially the religious ideology being expounded in this book reflects the interests of the ruling, exploiting classes. The Koran clearly defends the interests of the propertied classes: "Do not weep over the fact that we have made some of them equal by the flourishing of our life here on earth" (20,131). It reflects the class stratification which had occurred among the Arabs during the first half of the seventh century, as well as the class inequality and, of course, economic and social inequality. "We have divided their subsistence among them in this life and have elevated some by degrees over others, so that some of them take others into service" (43,31). And here Allah also consoles those to whom blessings have not been allotted: "But all this comprises only the blessings of this life here, while the future life will be spent with thy lord for the God-fearing" (43,34).

At the same time, while acknowledging the presence in society of rich men and poor men, free men and slaves, rulers and subordinates, the Koran does set forth the idea of the equality of all Moslems before Allah. It ignores the class and property inequality existing in society, dividing people only into Moslems and infidels.

In the literature of Islamic studies there is no unanimous opinion in evaluating the nature of the Koran's ideology: some authors regard the essence of its teaching as a reflection of the interests of the emergent class of slaveowners, while other authors emphasize the feudal lords in this regard. Nevertheless, there is a basis for recognizing that this book was created during the period when slaveowning relations were emerging in the Arab society. Allah is depicted in it as an unlimited property owner ("rabb"--meaning lord or master) while human beings, prophets and angels are depicted as his slaves (abd). Ye. A. Belyayev has noted that Islam as a new ideology reflected "essential changes in Arab society, namely: inequality of property, slavery, and the development of barter exchange."[7]

Bourgeois Islamic studies contain an extremely widespread concept of the democratic, even socialistic, nature of very early Islam. Attempts to idealize early Islam are very popular among present-day Moslem modernists. Those who promulgate this idea refer to Mohammed's preaching during the initial period of his activity.

The early (Meccan) suras of the Koran reflect the situation at the beginning of the seventh century in Mecca, the characteristics of trade and financial relations--a sphere well known to Mohammed. In these suras business affairs are approved of. Usury (2,276), false measure, and other machinations (55,6--8;83,1--3) are condemned and prohibited. These suras contain detailed instructions concerning the correct conduct of financial affairs, issuing loans, making up contracts, returning debts on time, and so forth (2,282 etc).

Mohammed the preacher scourged not only the foes of the new religion, who were hindering its activity, but also rich people and the power of the propertied classes, calling them tyrants ("zullam"); he condemned illegally acquired wealth and fame, expressed sympathy for the poor and destitute, called for the feeding of the poor, widows, and orphans, stating that they should not be driven away or insulted, and so forth.

Analogous passages in the Koran have provided a basis for many Islamic scholars (including some Soviet scholars during the 1930's) to characterize Mohammed as the ideologue of the poor strata of society. Such an evaluation, however, was made without taking into consideration the Koranic text in its entirety. The above-noted ideas were connected with specific historical events and the political situation in Mecca.

The "party" of Mohammed in Mecca consisted of middle-class and petty merchants, while a considerable portion of it was made up of the lower classes of society, even freed slaves. Basically, people gathered around him who were dissatisfied with the Omeyad aristocrats who were ruling in Mecca. The Medinans accepted and acknowledged Mohammed and his followers to a large extent because there existed a long-standing rivalry between the Meccan and Medinan authorities. Mohammed gathered around himself people who were dissatisfied with the Omeyad rich people, and he scourged these rich people, expressing sympathy for the poor and destitute. However, after the capture of Mecca by the Moslems (in the year 630) and the reconciliation between the two clans of the Quraysh--the Hashemites and the Omeyads--the latter was granted a privileged position in the state, and the ideas of sympathy for the poor and destitute disappeared from Mohammed's preaching. In a comparative analysis of the suras of the Koran before and after the year 630 this change in its nature may be seen clearly.

Thus, the religious teaching of the Koran in its essence constitutes an ideology which calls for the justification of the class inequality and emergent slaveowning relations in Arab society at the turn of the seventh century. This also comprises the tie-rod of the contents of the sacred book of the Moslems.

FOOTNOTES

1. For details about this subject see G. M. Kerimov's book, "Shariat i yego sotsial'naya sushchnost" [The Shariat and Its Social Essence], Moscow, 1978.

2. The Koran (in the translation by I. Yu. Krachkovskiy), Moscow, 1963. References to the text of the Koran are provided in accordance with the following commonly accepted rules: the first number indicates the sura, the numbers after the comma indicate the number of the ayats, while those after the semi-colon indicate another sura and its ayats.

3. See K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." (Works), Vol 10, p 167.

4. Sura 7 cites the legends about Nukh and the Flood (57--62), the Prophet Khud and the punishment of the Ad people (63--70), the Prophet Salikh and the Samud people (71--76), the Prophet Lut and the punishment of Sodom and Gomorrah (78--82), etc.

5. See K. Marx and F. Engels, Op. cit., Vol 9, p 427.

6. Ye. A. Belyayev, "Araby, islam i arabskiy khalifat v ranneye srednevekov'ye" /The Arabs, Islam, and the Arab Caliphate during the Early Middle Ages/, Moscow, 1965, p 115.

7. Ye. A. Belyayev, Op. cit., p 127.

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